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Introduction
Gender inequality is a major problem for development. First, the affected women are deprived of their basic freedoms (Sen, 1999) . Second, going beyond this intrinsic feature of gender inequality, it implies high costs for society in the form of lower human capital, worse governance, and lower growth (e.g. World Bank, 2001; Klasen, 2002) . Although the intrinsic and instrumental value of gender equality is known and set as a goal on the development agenda (e.g., Millennium Development Goal 3 "Promote gender equality and empower women"), gender inequality remains a pervasive phenomenon.
To measure the extent of this problem at the cross-country level several gender-related indices have been proposed, e.g. the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) (United Nations Development Programme, 1995) , the Global Gender Gap Index from the World Economic Forum (Lopez-Claros and Zahidi, 2005) , the Gender Equity Index developed by Social Watch (2005) or the African Gender Status Index proposed by the Economic Commission for Africa (2004) . These measures focus on gender inequality in well-being or in agency and they are typically outcome-focused (Klasen, 2006 (Klasen, , 2007 .
Focusing only on outcomes neglects the question of where gender inequality comes from. Gender inequality is mainly the result of human behavior. How people behave and interact is influenced by institutions. From an economics perspective, institutions are conceived as the result of collective choices in a society to achieve efficiency, solve collective action dilemmas and reduce transaction costs (e.g. North, 1990) . Other social sciences emphasize legitimacy and appropriateness instead of efficiency. Institutions influence the preferences of actors and provide role models that are internalized by them (Hall and Taylor, 1996; De Soysa and Jütting, 2007) .
There is a particular type of institutions that is relevant for gender inequality, social institutions related to gender inequality. Social institutions related to gender inequality are long-lasting norms, values and codes of conduct that find expression in traditions, customs and cultural practices, informal and formal laws. They influence human behavior as they frame gender-relevant meanings, form the basis of gender roles and become guiding principles in everyday life. Influencing the distribution of power between men and women in the private sphere of the family, in the economic sphere, and in public life, they constrain the opportunities of men and women and their capabilities to live the life they value (Sen, 1999) . Accounting for these social institutions is necessary to understand outcome gender inequality and the deprivation women experience. Additionally, neglecting them implies neglecting a major factor that might be related to development.
There are three measures that from a human rights perspective deal with the question of how women are treated in society: the Women's Political Rights index (WOPOL), the Women's Economic Rights index (WECON), and the Women's Social Rights index (WOSOC) of the CIRI Human Rights Data Project. 1 These indices measure on a yearly basis whether a number of internationally recognized rights for women are included in law and whether government enforces them. They proxy somehow the type of institutions we are concerned about, but also cover outcomes of these institutions. From the three indices, WOSOC is the most encompassing measure covering social relations (Bjornskov, Dreher, and Fischer, 2009 ). However, it does not allow to differentiate between different dimensions of social institutions. For example, it is important to distinguish between what happens within the family and what happens in public and social life. Furthermore, all three indices can only take four values from 0 (no rights) to 3 (legally guaranteed and enforced rights) which makes it difficult to compare and rank countries as there are many ties in the data.
This paper centers on the measurement of social institutions related to gender inequality. We propose new composite measures that proxy social institutions related to gender inequality in non-OECD countries based on variables of the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development database (Morrison and Jütting, 2005; Jütting, Morrison, DaytonJohnson, and Drechsler, 2008) . We aggregate the variables into five subindices that measure each one dimension of social institutions related to gender inequality (Family code, Civil liberties, Physical integrity, Son preference and Ownership rights). We combine the subindices into the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) as a multidimensional measure of deprivation of women.
In general, the construction of composite measures requires several decisions, for example about the weighting scheme and the method of aggregation (e.g. Nardo, Saisana, Saltelli, Tarantola, Hoffman, and Giovannini, 2005) . The subindices as one-dimensional measures are built using the method of polychoric PCA to extract the common information of the variables corresponding to a subindex. When we combine the subindices to construct the SIGI, we use a reasonable methodology to capture the multidimensional deprivation of women caused by social institutions. The formula of the SIGI is inspired by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984) and offers a new way of aggregating gender inequality in several dimensions measured by the subindices. It is transparent and easy to understand, it penalizes high inequality in each dimension and allows only for partial compensation between dimensions.
The SIGI and the subindices are useful tools to compare the societal situation of women 1 Information is available on the webpage of the project http://ciri.binghamton.edu/.
in over 100 non-OECD countries from a new perspective, allowing the identification of problematic countries and dimensions of social institutions that deserve attention by policy makers and need to be scrutinized in detail. Empirical results show that the SIGI provides additional information to that of other well-known gender-related indices. Moreover, regression analysis shows that the SIGI is related to indices that measure outcome gender inequality, even if one controls for region, religion and level of economic development.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database. Then, in sections 3 and 4 we focus on the construction of the subindices and of the SIGI. In section 5, we present empirical results by country, interesting regional patterns and a comparison between the SIGI and other gender-related measures. Furthermore, using regression analysis we illustrate the relevance of the SIGI for explaining outcome gender inequality. The last section concludes with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed measures.
2 The OECD Gender, Institutions and Development
Database
As input for the composite measures we use variables from the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database (Morrison and Jütting, 2005; Jütting et al., 2008) . This is a cross-country database covering about 120 countries with more than 20 variables measuring social institutions related to gender inequality. 2 These variables proxy social institutions through prevalence rates, legal indicators or indicators of social practices. We assume that the concept social institutions related to gender inequality is multidimensional. Following previous work done by the OECD (Jütting et al., 2008) we choose twelve variables that are assumed to measure each one of four dimensions of social institutions.
The Family code dimension refers to the private sphere with institutions that influence the decision-making power of women in the household. Family code is measured by the following four variables. Parental authority measures whether women have the right to be the legal guardian of a child during marriage, and whether women have custody rights over a child after divorce. Inheritance is based on formal inheritance rights of spouses. The public sphere is measured by the Civil liberties dimension that captures the freedom of social participation of women and includes the following two variables. Freedom of movement indicates the freedom of women to move outside the home. Freedom of dress is based on the obligation of women to use a veil or burqa to cover parts of their body in public.
The Physical integrity dimension comprises different indicators on violence against women. The variable violence against women indicates the existence of laws against domestic violence, sexual assault or rape, and sexual harassment. Female genital mutilation is the percentage of women who have undergone female genital mutilation. Missing women measures gender bias in mortality. Countries were coded based on estimates of gender bias in mortality for a sample of countries (Klasen and Wink, 2003) and on sex ratios of young people and adults.
The Ownership rights dimension covers the economic sphere of social institutions proxied by the access of women to several types of property. Women's access to land indicates whether women are allowed to own land. Women's access to bank loans measures whether women are allowed to access credits. Women's access to property other than land covers mainly access to real property such as houses, but also any other property.
Concerning the missing women variable in the Physical integrity dimension, it could be argued that it reflects another dimension of gender inequality. Missing women is an extreme manifestation of son preference under scarce resources. 100 million women are not alive who should be alive if women were not discriminated against (Sen, 1992; Klasen and Wink, 2003) . The other components of Physical integrity, violence against women and female genital mutilation, measure particularly the treatment of women which is not only motivated by economic considerations. In the next section, we check with statistical methods if missing women measures another dimension as the variables violence against women and female genital mutilation.
These twelve variables are between 0 and 1. The value 0 means no or very low inequality and the value 1 indicates high inequality. Three of the variables (early marriage, female genital mutilation and violence against women) are continuous. The other indi-cators measure social institutions on an ordinal categorical scale. The chosen variables cover around 120 non-OECD countries from all regions in the world except North America. 4 The choice of the variables is also guided by the availability of information so that as many countries as possible can be ranked by the SIGI. Within our sample 102 countries have information for all twelve variables.
Construction of the Subindices
The objective of the subindices is to provide a summary measure for each dimension of social institutions related to gender inequality. In every subindex we want to combine variables that are assumed to belong to one dimension. The first step is to check the statistical association between the variables. The second step consists in aggregating the variables with a reasonable weighting scheme.
Measuring the Association between Categorical Variables
To check the association between variables, and as most of them are ordinal, we use Kendall Tau b and Multiple Joint Correspondence Analysis (Greenacre, 2007; Nenadić, 2007) . Kendall Tau b is a rank correlation coefficient. These measures are useful when the data are ordinal and thus the conditions for using Pearson's correlation coefficient are not fulfilled. For each variable, the values are ordered and ranked. Then the correspondence between the rankings is measured. 5 Taking into account tied pairs, the formula for Kendall Tau b is
where C is the number of concordant pairs, D is the number of discordant pairs, n is the number of observations,
is the number of all pairs, T x is the number of pairs tied on 4 The OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database does not contain variables that capture relevant social institutions related to gender inequality in OECD countries. 5 For calculating Kendall Tau, one counts the number of concordant and discordant pairs of two rankings, builds the difference and divides this difference by the total number of pairs. A value of 1 means total correspondence of rankings, i.e. the rankings are the same. A value of -1 indicates reverse rankings or a negative association between rankings. A value of 0 means independence of rankings. Kendall Tau b is a variant of Kendall tau that corrects for ties, which are frequent in the case of discrete data (Agresti, 1984, chap. 9) . We consider Kendall Tau b to be the appropriate measure of rank correlation to find out whether our data are related.
the variable x and T y is the number of pairs tied on the variable y. The notation is taken from Agresti (1984) . As a second method to check the association between variables we examine the graphics produced by Multiple Joint Correspondence Analysis (MJCA) (Greenacre, 2007; Nenadić, 2007) , after having discretized the three continuous variables. Correspondence Analysis is a method for analyzing and representing the structure of contingency tables graphically. We use MJCA to find out whether variables seem to measure the same. 6 The results for Kendall tau b (Tables 1-5 ) are reported in Appendix 1. A significant positive value of Kendall tau b is a sign for a positive association between two variables. This is the case for all variables belonging to one dimension, except missing women in the subindex Physical integrity. The graphs produced with MJCA are available upon request. 7 The results of MJCA also confirm that within every dimension all the variables seem to measure the same dimension, with the exception of missing women in the dimension Physical integrity. These results support the argumentation in section 2. We decide to use the variable missing women as a fifth subindex called Son preference. The artificially higher female mortality is one of the most important and cruel aspects of gender inequality and should not be neglected, as over 100 million women that should be alive are missing (Sen, 1992; Klasen and Wink, 2003) . Missing women is the "starkest manifestation of the lack of gender equality" (Duflo, 2005) .
Aggregating Variables to Build a Subindex
The five subindices Family code, Civil liberties, Son preference, Physical integrity and Ownership rights use the twelve variables as input that were mentioned in the previous section. Each subindex combines variables that measure one dimension of social institutions related to gender inequality. In the case of Son preference, the subindex takes the 6 Correspondence Analysis is an exploratory and descriptive method to analyze contingency tables. Instead of calculating a correlation coefficient to capture the association of variables, the correspondence of conditional and marginal distributions of either rows or columns -also called row or column profiles -is measured using a χ 2 -statistic, that captures the distance between them. These row or column profiles then are plotted in a low-dimensional space, so that the distances between the points reflect the dissimilarities between the profiles. Multiple Joint Correspondence Analysis is an extended procedure for the analysis of more than two variables and considers the cross-tabulations of the variables against each other in a socalled Burt matrix but with modified diagonal sub-tables. This facilitates to figure out whether variables are associated. This is the case when they have similar deviations from homogeneity, and therefore get a similar position in a profile space (Greenacre, 2007; Nenadić, 2007) . 7 The graphs produced with MJCA can be interpreted in the following way. In most cases, one of the axes represents whether there is inequality and the other axe represents the extent of inequality. If one connects the values of a variable one obtains a graphical pattern. If this is similar to the pattern obtained for another variable, then both variables are associated.
value of the variable missing women. In all other cases, the computation of the subindex values involves two steps. In the first step, the method of polychoric principal component analysis is used to extract the common information of the variables corresponding to a subindex. Principal component analysis (PCA) is a method of dimensionality reduction that is valid for normally distributed variables (Jolliffe, 1986) . This assumption is violated in this case, as the data include variables that are ordinal, and hence the Pearson correlation coefficient is not appropriate. Following Kolenikov and Angeles (2004, 2009 ) we use polychoric PCA, which relies on polychoric and polyserial correlations. These are estimated with maximum likelihood, assuming that there are latent normally distributed variables that underly the ordinal categorical data. We use the First Principal Component (FPC) as a proxy for the common information contained by the variables corresponding to the subindices, measuring each one of the dimensions of social institutions related to gender inequality.
The first principal component is the weighted sum of the standardized original variables that captures as much of the variance in the data as possible. 8 The standardization of the original variables is done as follows. In the case of continuous variables, one subtracts the mean and then divides by the standard deviation. In the case of ordinal categorical variables, the standardization uses results of an ordered probit model. The weight that each variable gets in these linear combinations is obtained by analyzing the correlation structure in the data. The weights are shown in Table 6 . In the second step, the subindex value is obtained rescaling the FPC so that it ranges from 0 to 1 to ease interpretation. A country with the best possible performance (no inequality) is assigned the value 0 and a country with the worst possible performance (highest inequality) the value 1. Hence, the subindex values of all countries are between 0 and 1. Using the score of the FPC the subindex is calculated using the following transformation. Country X corresponds to a country of interest, Country Worst corresponds to a country with worst possible performance and Country Best is a country with best possible performance.
Every subindex is intended to measure a different dimension of social institutions related to gender inequality. To check whether the subindices are empirically non-redundant, so that they provide each additional information, we conduct an empirical analysis of the statistical association between them. In the case of well-being measures, McGillivray and White (1993) suggest using two explicit thresholds to separate redundancy from nonredundancy, that is a correlation coefficient of 0.90 and 0.70. Based on this suggestion we use the threshold 0.80. In Table 7 we present Kendall tau b as a measure of the statistical association between the five subindices. In all cases, the subindices are positively correlated, showing that they all measure social institutions related to gender inequality. It must be noted, however, that the correlation is not always statistically significant. Kendall tau b is lower than 0.80 in all cases, which means that each subindex measures a distinct aspect of social institutions related to gender inequality.
The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI)
With the subindices described in the last section as input, we build a multidimensional composite index named Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) which reflects the deprivation of women caused by social institutions related to gender inequality. The proposed index is transparent and easy to understand. As in the case of the variables and of the subindices, the index value 0 corresponds to no inequality and the value 1 to complete inequality.
The SIGI is an unweighted average of a non-linear function of the subindices. We use equal weights for the subindices, as we see no reason for valuing one of the dimensions more or less than the others. 9 The non-linear function arises because we assume that inequality in gender-related social institutions leads to deprivation experienced by the affected women, and that deprivation increases more than proportionally when inequality increases. Thus, high inequality is penalized in every dimension. The non-linearity also means that the SIGI does not allow for total compensation among subindices, but permits partial compensation. Partial compensation implies that high inequality in one dimension, i.e. subindex, can only be partially compensated with low inequality on another dimension. 10 9 Empirically, even in the case of equal weights the ranking produced by a composite index is influenced by the different variances of its components. The component that has the highest variance has the largest influence on the composite index. In the case of the SIGI the variances of the five components are reasonably close to each other, Ownership rights having the largest and Physical integrity having the lowest variance. 10 Other approaches have been also proposed in the literature, e.g. the non-compensatory approach by For our specific five subindices, the value of the index the SIGI is then calculated as follows.
Using a more general notation, the formula for the SIGI I(X ), where X is the vector containing the values of the subindices x i with i = 1, ..., n, is derived from the following considerations. For any subindex x i , we interpret the value 0 as the goal of no inequality to be achieved in every dimension. We define a deprivation function φ( Subramanian, 2007) . Higher values of x i should lead to a penalization in I(X ) that should increase with the distance x i to zero. In our case the deprivation function is the square of the distance to 0 so that deprivation increases more than proportionally as inequality increases.
The formula is inspired by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures (Foster et al., 1984) . The general FGT formula is defined for y i ≤ z as:
where Y is the vector containing all incomes, y i with i = 1, ..., n is the income of individual i, z is the poverty line, and α > 0 is a penalization parameter.
To compute the SIGI, the value 2 is chosen for α as the square function has the advantage of easy interpretation. With α = 2 the transfer principle is satisfied (Foster et al., 1984) . In the context of poverty this principle means that a transfer from a person below the poverty line to a person less poor will raise poverty if the set of poor remains Munda and Nardo (2005a,b). unchanged. In the case of the SIGI, the transfer principle means that an increase in inequality in one dimension and a decrease of inequality in another dimension of the same magnitude will raise the SIGI.
Some differences between the SIGI and the FGT measures must be highlighted. In the case of the SIGI, we are aggregating across dimensions and not over individuals. Moreover, in contrast to the income case, a lower value of x i is preferred, and the normalization achieved when dividing by the poverty line z is not necessary as 0 ≤ x i ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , n.
The SIGI fulfills several properties. For a formal presentation of the properties and the proofs, see Appendix 2.
• Support and range: The value of the index can be computed for any values of the subindices, and it is always between 0 and 1.
• Anonymity: Neither the name of the country nor the name of the subindex have an impact on the value of the index.
• Unanimity or Pareto Optimality: If a country has values for every subindex that are lower than or equal to those of another country, then the index value for the first country is lower than or equal to the one for the second country.
• Monotonicity: If one country has a lower value for the index than a second country, and a third country has the same values for the subindices as the first country, except for one subindex which is lower, then the third country has a lower index value than the second country.
• Penalization of dispersion: For two countries with the same average value of the subindices, the country with the lowest dispersion of the subindices gets a lower value for the index.
• Compensation: Although the SIGI is not conceived for changes over time this property is more intuitively understood in the following way. If a country experiences an increase in inequality by a given amount on a subindex, then the country can only have the same value of the index as before, if there is a decrease in inequality on another subindex that is higher in absolute value than the increase.
To highlight the effects of partial compensation as compared to total compensation we computed the statistical association between the SIGI and a simple arithmetic average of the five subindices that allows for total compensation and compared the country rankings of both measures in Appendix 3. 11 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the SIGI and the simple arithmetic average of the five subindices shows a high and statistically significant correlation between both measures (Table 8) . However, when we compare the ranks of the SIGI with those obtained using a simple arithmetic average of the five subindices in Table 9 , we observe that there are noticeable differences in the rankings of the 102 included countries. Examples are China and Nepal. China ranks in position 55 using the simple average, but worsens to place 83 in the SIGI ranking. Nepal has place 84 considering the simple average, and improves to rank 65 using the SIGI. For China, this is due to the high value on the subindex Son preference, which in the SIGI case cannot be fully compensated with relatively low values for the other subindices. For Nepal we observe the opposite case as all subindices have values reflecting moderate inequality.
Results

Country Rankings and Regional Patterns
In Appendix 4, the results for the SIGI and its five subindices are presented. Among the 102 countries considered by the SIGI 12 (Table 10 ) Paraguay, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Argentina and Costa Rica have the lowest levels of gender inequality related to social institutions. Sudan is the country that occupies the last position, followed by Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Mali and Yemen, which means that gender inequality in social institutions is a major problem there.
Rankings according to the subindices are as follows. For Family code 112 countries can be ranked. Best performers are China, Jamaica, Croatia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Worst performers are Mali, Chad, Afghanistan, Mozambique and Zambia. In the dimension Civil liberties 123 countries are ranked. Among them 83 share place 1 in the ranking. Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Yemen and Iran occupy the last five positions of high inequality. 114 countries can be compared with the subindex Physical Integrity. Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Chinese Taipei, Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay and Philippines are at the top of the ranking while Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt and Sierra Leone are at the bottom. In the dimension Son preference 88 out of 123 countries rank at the top as they 11 We cannot compare the SIGI with the results of the non-compensatory index as proposed by Munda and Nardo (2005a,b) . The algorithm used for calculating non-compensatory indices compares pairwise each country for each subindex. However, as our dataset includes many countries with equal values on several subindices, the numerical algorithm cannot provide a ranking. 12 The subindices are computed for countries that have no missing values on the relevant input variables. In the case of the SIGI only countries that have values for every subindex are considered.
do not have problems with missing women. The countries that rank worst are China, Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, India and Bhutan. Finally, 122 countries are ranked with the subindex Ownership rights. 42 countries share position 1 as they have no inequality in this dimension. On the other hand the four worst performing countries are Sudan, Sierra Leone, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo. To find out whether apparent regional patterns in social institutions related to gender inequality are systematic, we divide the countries in quintiles following the scores of the SIGI and its subindices (Table 11 in Appendix 5). The first quintile includes countries with lowest inequality, and the fifth quintile countries with highest inequality. For the SIGI, no country of Europe and Central Asia (ECA) or Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is found in the two quintiles reflecting social institutions related to high gender inequality. In contrast, most countries in South Asia (SA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) rank in these two quintiles. It is interesting to note that in the most problematic regions two countries rank in the first two quintiles. These are Mauritius (SSA) and Tunisia (MENA). East Asia and Pacific (EAP) has countries in all five quintiles with Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore in the first quintile and China in the fifth quintile.
Going on with the subindices the patterns are similar to the one of the SIGI. As more information is available for the subindices, the number of countries covered by every subindex is different and higher than for the SIGI. In the following some interesting facts are highlighted, especially countries whose scores are different than the average in the region.
• Family code: No country in ECA, LAC or EAP shows high inequality. SA, MENA and SSA remain problematic with countries with social institutions related to high gender inequality. Exceptions are Bhutan in SA, Mauritius in SSA, and Tunisia and Israel in MENA.
• Civil liberties: Only three groups of countries using the quintile analysis can be generated with the first group including the first three quintiles. In SSA over onehalf of the countries are now in the first group. Also in MENA there are some countries with good scores (Israel, Morocco and Tunisia) . No country in SA is found in the first three quintiles of low and moderate inequality.
• Physical integrity: Most problematic regions are SSA and MENA. Exceptions in these regions are Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and Tanzania (SSA), and Morocco and Tunisia (MENA).
• Son preference: Again only three groups of countries can be built by quintile analysis, with the first group including the first three quintiles. As in the case of Civil liberties most of the countries in SSA do not show problems. Missing women is mainly an issue in SA and MENA. But in both regions there are countries that rank in the first group. These are Sri Lanka in SA, and Israel, Lebanon and Occupied Palestinian Territory in MENA.
• Ownership rights: Most problematic regions are SA, SSA and MENA. Nevertheless, there are cases in these regions that rank in the first quintile. These are Egypt, Israel, Kuwait and Tunisia (MENA), Bhutan (SA), and Eritrea and Mauritius (SSA).
Simple Correlation with other Gender-related Indices
The SIGI is an important measure to understand gender inequality as it measures institutions that influence the basic functioning of society and explain gender inequality in outcomes. From this perspective, the SIGI has an added value to other gender-related measures irrespective from an empirical redundancy perspective, i.e. whether it provides additional information as compared to other measures. Nevertheless, one can check whether the index is empirically redundant with an empirical analysis of the statistical association between the SIGI and other well-known genderrelated indices. Relying on McGillivray and White (1993) we use a correlation coefficient of 0.80 in absolute value as the threshold to separate redundancy from non-redundancy. We calculated Pearson correlation coefficient and Kendall tau b as a measure of rank correlation between the SIGI and each of the following indices: the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) from United Nations Development Programme (2006), the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) from Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi (2007) and the Women's Social Rights Index. 13 As the GDI and the GEM have been criticized in the literature (e.g. Klasen, 2006; Schüler, 2006) , we also do the analysis for two alternative measures, the Gender Gap Index Capped (GGI) and a revised Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM2) based on income shares proposed by Klasen and Schüler (2009) . 14 For all the indices considered both measures of statistical 13 Data obtained from http://ciri.binghamton.edu/. 14 The Gender Gap Index Capped (GGI) is a geometric mean of the ratios of female to male achievements in the dimensions health, education and labor force participation. Capped means that every component is capped at one before calculating the geometric mean. This is necessary as a better relative performance of women, e.g. in the dimension health can be due to a risky behavior of men that should not be rewarded. GGI can be more directly interpreted as a measure of gender inequality while the GDI measures human development penalizing gender inequality. The GEM has three components, political representation, representation in senior positions in the economy, and power over economic resources.
association are lower than 0.80 in absolute value and statistically significant. We conclude that the SIGI is related to these gender measures but is non-redundant. These results as well as the comparison of the country rankings of the SIGI and these other measures can be found in Tables 12 and 13 (Appendix 6).
Regression Analysis
The SIGI is aimed to measure the institutional basis of gender inequality. To explore whether the SIGI is associated with gender inequality in outcomes we use linear regressions with two well-known measures as dependent variables and the SIGI as regressor.
The first is the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) that captures gaps in outcome variables related to basic rights such as health, economic participation and political empowerment. The second measure is the ratio of GDI to HDI as composite measure of gender inequality in the dimensions health, education and income. 15 In both regressions we control for the level of economic development using the log of per capita GDP in constant prices (US$, PPP, base year: 2005) (World Bank, 2008) ; for religion using a Muslim majority and a Christian majority dummy, the left-out category being countries that have neither a majority of Muslim nor a majority of Christian population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009);
and for geography and other unexplained heterogeneity that might go together with region using region dummies, the left-out category being Sub-Saharan Africa. As the number of observations is lower than 100, we use HC3 robust standard errors proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) to account for possible heteroscedasticity in our data. The regression using GGG as dependent variable is presented in Table ? ?. It includes 72 countries and the coefficient of determination R 2 is 0.66. the SIGI is negatively associated with GGG and significant at the 1% level. The second regression with the ratio of GDI to HDI as dependent variable is shown in Table ? ?. The sample consists of 78 countries and R 2 is 0.50. The SIGI is again negatively associated with the response variable and this association is statistically significant at the 1% level. The results suggest that gender inequality in well-being and empowerment is strongly associated with social institutions that shape gender roles.
Even if we include control variables in the regressions we cannot rule out omitted variable bias, but as we consider that social institutions related to gender inequality are relaThe most problematic component is power over economic resources proxied by earned incomes. This component measures female and male earned incomes using income levels adjusted by gender gaps but not the gender gaps themselves. The revised version GEM2 uses income shares of males and females. 15 As the GDI is not a measure of gender inequality, UNDP recommends using the ratio of GDI to HDI (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/gdi_gem/).
tively stable and long-lasting, we consider that endogeneity does not pose a major problem. To check that our findings are not driven by observations that have large residuals and/or high leverage, we also run robust regressions obtaining similar results. 16
Conclusion
In this paper we present composite indices that offer a new way to approach gender inequality that has been neglected in the literature and by other gender measures that focus mainly on well-being and agency. Instead of measuring gender inequality in education, health, economic or political participation and other dimensions, the proposed measures proxy the underlying social institutions that are mirrored by societal practices and legal norms that might produce inequalities between women and men in developing countries. When constructing composite indices one is always confronted with decisions and trade-offs concerning for example the choice and treatment of the variables included, the weighting scheme and the aggregation method. We try to be transparent in our choices.
As the subindices are intended to proxy each one dimension of social institutions, we use the method of polychoric PCA to extract the common element of the included variables (Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009). The methodology for constructing the multidimensional SIGI is based on the assumption that in each dimension deprivation of women increases more than proportionally when inequality increases, and that each dimension should be weighted equally. The formula of the SIGI is inspired by the FGT poverty measures (Foster et al., 1984) and has the advantage of penalizing high inequality in each dimension and only allowing for partial compensation among the five dimensions. We consider that the formula to compute the SIGI is easy to understand and to communicate. 16 Results are available upon request. The type of robust regression we perform uses iteratively reweighted least squares and is described in Hamilton (1992) . A regression is run with ordinary least squares, then case weights based on absolute residuals are calculated, and a new regression is performed using these weights. The iterations continue as long as the maximum change in weights remains above a specified value.
However, some limitations of the subindices and the SIGI must be noted. First, a composite index depends on the quality of the data used as input. Social institutions related to gender inequality are hard to measure and the work accomplished by the OECD building the GID database is an important step forward. It is worth to continue this endeavor and invest more resources in the measurement of social institutions related to gender inequality. This includes data coverage, coding schemes and the refinement of indicators.
It would be useful to exploit data available, for example from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 17 that specifically address the perception that women have of violence against women, and to finance surveys in countries where data is not available.
Second, by aggregating variables and subindices, some information is inevitably lost. Figures and rankings according to the SIGI and the subindices should not substitute a careful investigation of the variables from the database. Furthermore, to understand the situation in a given country additional qualitative information could be valuable.
Third, one should keep in mind that OECD countries are not included in our sample as social institutions related to gender inequality in these countries are not well captured by the 12 variables used for building the composite measures. This does not mean that this phenomenon is not relevant for OECD countries, but that further research is required to develop appropriate measures.
Nonetheless, the SIGI and its subindices offer a new perspective to understand gender inequality. Empirical results show that the SIGI is statistically non-redundant and adds new information to other well-known gender-related measures. The SIGI and the five subindices can help policy-makers to detect in what developing countries and in which dimensions of social institutions problems need to be addressed. For example, according to the SIGI scores, regions with highest inequality are South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Middle East and North Africa. The composite measures can be valuable instruments to generate public discussion. Moreover, the SIGI and its subindices have the potential to influence current development thinking as they highlight social institutions that affect overall development. As it is shown in the literature (e.g. Klasen, 2002; Klasen and Lamanna, 2009 ) gender inequality in education negatively affects overall development. Economic research investigating these outcome inequality should consider social institutions related to gender inequality as possible explanatory factors. Results from regression analysis show that the SIGI is related to gender inequality in well-being and empowerment, even after controlling for region, religion and the level of economic development. Kolenikov, S. and G. Angeles (2004) The p-values correspond to the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. For a description of these variables, see section 2. The p-value correspond to the null hypothesis that two variables are independent. 
Kendall tau b: Dimension Civil Liberties
Kendall tau b: Dimension Ownership Rights
Civil liberties
Freedom of movement 0.7071 Obligation to wear a veil 0.7071
Physical integrity
Female genital mutilation 0.7071 Violence against women 0.7071
Ownership rights
Woment's access to land 0.5811 Woment's access to loans 0.5665 Woment's access to other property 0.5843 
Kendall tau b between Subindices
Appendix 2: Objectives, Properties and Proofs
In this section, we present the objectives and properties that we consider relevant for any composite index related to social institutions related to gender inequality. Moreover, we show that the proposed index fulfills all of them.
We use the following notation. Let X j , with j = A, B, be the vector containing the the values of the subindices x j i , with i = 1, ..., n, for the country j 18 . I(X ) represents the composite index.
Objectives of the Index
The objectives of the index are the following:
1. The index I(X ) should represent the level of gender inequality, so that countries can be ranked.
2. The interpretation of I(X ) should be straightforward. As in the case of the subindices x i , the value 0 should correspond to no inequality and the value 1 to complete inequality.
3. For any subindex x i , we interpret the value 0, i.e. no inequality, as the goal to be achieved.
The value zero can be thought of as a poverty line (see Ravallion, 1994; Deaton, 1997; Subramanian, 2007 , and references therein). We define a deprivation function φ(x i , 0), with φ(x i , 0) > 0 if x i > 0, and φ(x i , 0) = 0 if x i = 0. Higher values of x i should lead to a penalization in I(X ) that should increase with the distance x i to zero, i.e.
∂I(X) ∂x i
> 0, and
4. I(X ) should not allow for total compensation among variables, but permit partial compensation. This somehow relates to the transfer axioms that should be fulfilled by inequality as well as poverty measures. A decrease in x i , i.e. less inequality, is rewarded more in I(X ) than an equivalent increase in another variable x k (see Atkinson, 1970; Kakwani, 1984; Shorrocks and Foster, 1987; Subramanian, 2007; Alkire and Foster, 2008 , and references therein).
I(X )
should be easy to compute and transparent.
Properties of the Index
Some of the properties that any index should fulfill are:
1. Support and range of I(X ):
18 In what follows, the superscript j will only be used if it is necessary to distinguish countries.
• 0 ≤ I(X ) ≤ 1 must hold for any X .
• If x i = 0 ∀i, then I(X ) = 0. If x i = 1 ∀i, then I(X ) = 1.
Anonymity (symmetry):
The value of I(X j ) does not depend either on the names of the subindices nor on the name of the country ( j).
3. Unanimity (Pareto Optimality):
Monotonicity:
If considering X A and X B country A is preferred to country B, and only x A i improves (i.e. decreases) for a given i, while x B i ∀i remains unchanged, then country A should still be preferred over country B. 
Proofs
The composite index I(X ) is defined as
The index proposed fulfills all the stated properties.
Support and range of I(X )
• I(X ) is defined for 0 ≤ x i ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , n.
• For any X , we have that 0 ≤ I(X ) ≤ 1.
Anonymity (symmetry)
Unanimity (Pareto Optimality)
If we assume that ∀i
then we can show that
.
Monotonicity
We assume that
Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that subindex x 1 improves (decreases) by δ > 0 for country A. Then we have that
and hence
This means that
with X A * defined as the vector corresponding to country A with only one variable having improved (decreased) by δ.
Penalization of inequality in the case of equal means
If we assume equal means, so that
If we assume that the variance of X A is smaller than the variance of X B so that
we can show that
Compensation property
In a two-variable example, let △x 1 ≤ 1 − x 1 , and △x 2 ≤ 1 − x 2 . a) We can show that if △x 1 = △x 2 = δ > 0, then
and hence we have shown that if x 1 increases by δ and x 2 decreases by δ, then I(X ) must increase.
We will show that if x 1 increases by △x 1 and x 2 decreases by △x 1 and the value of the index remains unchanged, the increase of x 1 must be smaller than the absolute value of the decrease in x 2 .
Using the fact that x 1 = x 2 = x, we can rewrite this as
As 2x > 0, (△x 1 ) 2 > 0, and (△x 2 ) 2 > 0, we must have that The data are sorted according to the value of the SIGI.
Appendix 4: Rankings of Countries according to the SIGI and its Subindices
Ranking according to the SIGI and the Five Subindices 
